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Abstract
How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We
address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 × 2 dominance solvable
coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human
subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program
whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the
latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive
ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.
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1 Introduction
Coordination games provide a useful game-theoretical paradigm for analyzing a wide range of
economic phenomena, such as macroeconomic fluctuations (Cooper and John, 1988), bank runs and
speculative currency attacks on financial markets (Morris and Shin, 2003; Heinemann, 2012), and
commercial production processes (Brandts, Cooper, and Weber, 2014). Because of the multiplicity
and the Pareto-rankability of the Nash equilibria in these games, and because decisions are usually
made in a state of strategic uncertainty regarding others’ behavior, the resulting outcomes can be
driven away from the Pareto–Nash equilibrium—a phenomenon known as coordination failure.
Coordination failure has been shown to be a persistent pattern in numerous lab implementa-
tions (Camerer, 2003, Ch.7). The present paper contributes to a large body of experimental studies
exploring this welfare-reducing phenomenon. A vast part of this literature is based on the core
idea that coordination failures arise from strategic uncertainty, and various institutional designs
are put forth as a remedy against it: introducing repeated encounters, varying the stability and the
size of groups, providing information feedback, allowing for observation of others’ past behavior,
or introducing pre-play communication between players (see also Devetag and Ortmann, 2007, for
an extensive survey of this literature.) However, although these mechanisms are usually found to
improve efficient coordination, they fall short of completely solving the problem of coordination
failure.
In this paper, we take a further step to deepen our understanding of the nature of coordination
failure. Our experimental results confirm that strategic uncertainty is an important determinant
of the efficiency of strategic decision-making. Even more importantly, our experiment shows that
individual cognitive ability has a strong link with the way strategic uncertainty influences the
decisions of subjects in our experimental coordination games.
Our investigation involves a classic 2 × 2 coordination game, based on Selten (1975) and
Rosenthal (1981), and is presented in Table 1. With L < S < H, m < h, and s < h, the
game is one-step dominance solvable: the elimination of Player B’s weakly dominated strategy
l immediately leads to the Pareto–Nash equilibrium (R, r). Moreover, from the standard theory
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Table 1: A simple two-person two-action dominance solvable coordination game
Player B
Player A
l r
L (S ; s) (S ; s)
R (L ; m) (H ; h)
perspective, (R, r) is a natural candidate for a focal point, since it is also risk dominant.1
Notwithstanding these predictions, various studies have found a frequent failure to achieve the
efficient equilibrium (see, e.g., Beard and Beil, 1994; Beard, Beil, and Mataga, 2001; Goeree and
Holt, 2001; Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003; Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn, 2014) both in sequential
and simultaneous implementations of this game. Depending on the exact experimental setup,
between 20 and 84 % of observed outcomes are not Pareto efficient. While the literature has
long focused on the strategic uncertainty faced by Player A as the source of coordination failures
in these experiments, recent evidence provides different clues for explaining this behavior. For
example, Polonio, Di Guida, and Coricelli (2014) use eye-tracking data gathered from simple 2×2
games to demonstrate that some subjects do not pay attention to the payoffs of their opponent,
and thus do not realize that the opponent has a dominant strategy. Thus, some Player As in
our coordination game may choose L without taking Player Bs’ behavior into consideration at
all—which precludes any meaningful role of strategic uncertainty on the decision-making of the
former.
Therefore, the first aim of this paper is to understand the extent to which deviations from
strategy R by Player As is due to strategic uncertainty, which constitutes an important step to-
wards designing more efficient mechanisms aimed at eliminating coordination failure. To address
this issue we conduct a set of experiments based on four variations of a dominance solvable coordi-
nation game shown in Table 1, in which human subjects (acting as Player As) interact with Player
Bs represented by either (a) other human subjects, or (b) a computer program. Computerized
1Another Nash equilibrium, (L, l), involves a weakly dominant strategy l by Player B. The existence of a clear-
cut theoretical benchmark distinguishes this game from another well-known 2 × 2 coordination game, the stag
hunt, in which each Nash equilibrium is supported by a certain solution concept – either payoff dominance or risk
dominance.
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Player Bs are programmed to always choose r, and this fact is clearly explained to the subjects.
Therefore, subjects acting as Player As interacting with computers do not face any strategic un-
certainty, which provides an empirical benchmark for assessing the effect of strategic uncertainty
on Player As’ behavior in human–human interactions.
In this sense, our experiment is related to a recent and growing body of experimental stud-
ies that seek to separate and evaluate the behavioral effect of strategic uncertainty in collective
decision-making. For example, in an alternating bargaining game, Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and
Rymon (2002) investigated the effects of two potential causes for failure in backward induction:
confusion or other-regarding social preferences. They found evidence that confusion was an impor-
tant cause of deviations from the equilibrium outcome. Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Ferraro
and Vossler (2010) do the same in public good contribution experiments, and estimate that con-
fusion explained up to around one half of contribution levels. Fehr and Tyran (2001) focused
on the strategic aspects of “nominal illusion”. They considered four-player repeated price setting
games, and introduced a negative nominal shock in the middle of the experiment. They found
that roughly half of non-immediate adjustment to the new equilibrium after the shock was due to
individual bounded rationality (or confusion) and the other half was due to strategic uncertainty.
Finally, Akiyama, Hanaki, and Ishikawa (2015) investigated the magnitude of the effect of strategic
uncertainty in explaining the observed deviation of price forecasts from the fundamental values in
an experimental asset market à la Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). They found significant
effects of both confusion and strategic uncertainty.2
Our second objective is to shed new light on the relationship between cognitive ability and
strategic thinking. In particular, we investigate whether the failure to seek efficiency by choosing R
is more widespread among Player As with low cognitive ability than for those with high cognitive
ability. We address this question by conducting a cognitive ability test in several experimental
sessions (involving both human–human and human–robot interactions), and correlate the efficiency
2Other studies, somewhat less related to ours, used robots that did not follow equilibrium strategies as a way to
control for subjects’ beliefs about the behavior of their opponents. For instance, Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010)
used robots to replicate past behaviors of their subjects, and Embrey, Fréchette, and Lehrer (2014) and Costa-
Gomes and Crawford (2006) used robots to make some players follow the predetermined distribution of boundedly
rational behaviors.
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of observed behavior and subjects’ test scores, while controlling for the presence of strategic
uncertainty.
From this perspective, our study contributes to recent literature that investigates the relation-
ship between subjects’ cognitive ability and their degree of strategic sophistication. For example,
Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz, and Hernán (2012) reported that subjects with higher scores on
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) choose, on average, numbers closer to the
Nash equilibrium in the beauty contest games. In the same vein, Akiyama, Hanaki, and Ishikawa
(2015) reported that the magnitude of the effect of strategic uncertainty is positively correlated
with subjects’ scores on the CRT test, while the effect of confusion is negatively correlated with the
score. Burks, Carpenter, Goette, and Rustichini (2009) reported that subjects (trainee truckers)
with higher scores in Raven’s progressive matrix test3 are more patient and more willing to take
calculated risks.4 In addition, they reported that subjects with higher Raven’s test scores more ac-
curately predict others’ behavior in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game, and better adapt their
behavior to others’ behavior. Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) showed that subjects with
higher scores in Raven’s test more frequently win in “Race to 5, 10, or 15” games5 and guessed
others’ choices better in a 20-player beauty contest game. Finally, Gill and Prowse (2015) also
reported that subjects with higher scores in Raven’s test not only choose numbers closer to the
equilibrium in a repeated 3-player beauty contest game, but also respond to the average score of
other subjects in the group by choosing number close to the equilibrium when facing with others
with higher scores than when facing with others with lower scores. Fehr and Huck (2015) reported
3Raven’s progressive matrix test (often called Raven’s test) is a picture based, non-verbal measure of fluid
intelligence, that is “the capacity to think logically, analyze and solve novel problems, independent of background
knowledge" (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013, p. 48). It is widely used by, e.g., psychologists, educators and the
military (Raven, 2000). It consists of a series of tasks to be solved within a fixed amount of time (for instance,
we use a series of 16 tasks to be solved in 10 min). In each task, a subject should pick a single element (among
8 options) that best fits a set of 8 pictures. These pictures are put into a certain logical order and presented in a
3× 3 table with a blank space in the bottom right corner. The level of difficulty increases from one question to the
other. See Raven (2008) for an overview.
4Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) reported similar correlations between cognitive ability (measured
with a verbal and a nonverbal task related to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale) and risk and time preferences
in a representative sample of the representative German population.
5The “Race to 5 (or 10 or 15)” game is a two player sequential move game in which two players, moving
alternatively, can put either 1, 2 or 3 stones in a common hat which is empty at the beginning. The player who
puts the 5th (or 10th or 15th, respectively) stone in the hat wins. The first mover has a clear advantage in this
game, and one can derive the winning strategy by a backward induction. The difficulty of deriving the winning
strategy increases with the number of target stones.
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similar results from a beauty contest game. They found a critical threshold of cognitive ability
(measured by CRT) below which subjects choose random numbers and do not respond to their
beliefs about others’ cognitive ability. Subjects with cognitive ability above this threshold, how-
ever, tend to act much more strategically: they systematically choose lower numbers and respond
to their beliefs about the cognitive ability of other players. Finally, recent evidence from psycho-
logical research reveals the relationship between fluid intelligence and the theory of mind (Ibanez,
Huepe, Gempp, Gutiérrez, Rivera-Rei, and Toledo, 2013).6
To sum up, these empirical studies suggest that people with high cognitive ability respond
more aptly to strategic conditions they face than those with low cognitive ability. The present
study extends this investigation to a new and important economic environment—the coordination
game. As will be seen, we find that Player As’ failure to choose R can be only partially explained
by uncertainty about their partners’ intentions: in many cases, the former act in this manner even
when interacting with a computer program that is known to always act reliably by choosing r. We
also report that Player As with high cognitive ability (measured in terms of Raven’s test scores)
tend to be more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with low cognitive ability.
2 Experimental design
We consider four payoff matrices based on the simultaneous-move coordination game shown in
Table 1. Our main manipulation lies in varying the nature of Player B, who may be represented
either by a human subject (Human treatment) or a pre-programmed computer (Robot treatment).
All games and treatments are implemented using a between-subject design—only one version of
the game is played in each experimental session. In all the sessions, the one-shot game is repeated
ten times with participants’ roles remaining fixed, pairs being rematched in each round using a
6Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001) developed the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes" test
(RMET) to measure one’s theory of mind—the capacity to infer the internal emotional states of others. RMET
consists of a series of photos of the area of the face involving the eyes. Subjects are asked to choose one of the four
words that best describes what the person in the photo is thinking or feeling. Ibanez, Huepe, Gempp, Gutiérrez,
Rivera-Rei, and Toledo (2013) found that people with high scores in Raven’s test also perform better in RMET. In
an experimental investigation of the Level-k model, Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015) found a positive correlation
between the score in RMET test and the propensity to adapt Level-1 reasoning.
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Table 2: The experimental games
B
A
l r
L (9.75 ; 3.00) ( 9.75 ; 3.00)
R (3.00 ; 4.75) (10.00 ; 5.00)
B
A
l r
L (8.50 ; 3.00) ( 8.50 ; 3.00)
R (6.50 ; 4.75) (10.00 ; 5.00)
Baseline 1 Baseline 2
B
A
l r
L (9.75 ; 8.50) ( 9.75 ; 8.50)
R (3.00 ; 8.50) (10.00 ; 10.00)
B
A
l r
L (8.50 ; 8.50) ( 8.50 ; 8.50)
R (6.50 ; 8.50) (10.00 ; 10.00)
Egalitarian 1 Egalitarian 2
perfect stranger, round-robin procedure7 and take-home earnings corresponding to a single round
randomly drawn at the end of each experimental session. At the end of each round, subjects are
only informed of their own payoffs.
2.1 Treatments and hypotheses
The four experimental game matrices are presented in Table 2. Two of them have already been
experimentally studied in the literature. Baseline Game 1 (BG1, shown on the top left panel of
Table 2) was used as the baseline treatment in Beard and Beil (1994); Beard, Beil, and Mataga
(2001), Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2013, 2014). Egalitarian Game 2 (EG2, shown on the bot-
tom right panel of Table 2) was one of the additional matrices introduced by Jacquemet and
Zylbersztejn (2014) in an attempt to assess the effect of the relative payoff structure on subjects’
behavior. The latter study reports a strong divergence between both players’ behavior in these
two games: weak reliability from Player Bs (80.7 % of decisions r) coupled with weak reliance from
7Repetition allows to assess the extent to which inefficient behavior is sensitive to learning. For this sake, we use
an indefinitely repeated game with one-round compensation rule1 as an attempt to homogenize incentives across
rounds, and allow for an accumulation of experience from a series of uniform one-shot interactions. Kamecke (1997)
shows that our perfect stranger, round-robin procedure is optimal for this purpose since it maximizes the number
of rounds for a given number of players and the one-shot nature of each interaction between subjects.
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Player As (49 % of decisions R) in BG1, and nearly universal reliability from Player Bs (94.3 % of
r) coupled with strong (yet imperfect) reliance from Player As (74 % of R) in EG2.8 Importantly,
Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014) provide systematic evidence that these outcomes cannot be
explained by inequality aversion.
The payoff structures of BG1 and EG2 differ in terms of both players’ monetary incentives to
seek efficiency. In BG1, Player As may improve their situation only slightly when moving from
L to (R, r) (from 9.75 to 10, a difference of .25), while a failed attempt to rely on Player Bs,
resulting in (R, l), is very costly (yielding only 3 to Player As). In EG2, these two cases become
more balanced—the gain for moving from L to (R, r) increases (from 8.5 to 10, a difference of
1.5), and the cost of relying on the other player in vain becomes less severe, with (R, l) now giving
6.5 to Player As. Analogous variations occur for Player Bs. The efficiency premium (conditional
on Player As’ reliance) is quite low in BG1 (from 4.75 to 5, a difference of .25) and drastically
rises in EG2 (from 8.5 to 10, a difference of 1.5). Altogether, EG2 provides much more salient
monetary incentives to act efficiently to both players.9 To account for subjects’ responses to the
changes in their own as well as their partners’ monetary incentives, we introduce two intermediate
payoff matrices: Baseline Game 2 (BG2) and Egalitarian Game 1 (EG1) shown, respectively,
in the top-right and bottom-left corners of Table 2. Each of the two games differs in only one
dimension—that is, either Player As’ payoffs or Player Bs’ payoffs—as compared to BG1 and EG2:
BG2 (EG1) has Player A’s payoffs taken from EG2 (BG1) and Player B’s payoffs taken from BG1
(EG2). Thus, the four games enable us to test the following hypotheses for the Human condition:
Hypothesis 1 In the Human treatment, the variations in the monetary incentives affect players’
behavior as follows:
(a) Player As react to the variations in their own monetary incentives to seek efficiency: the
proportion of decisions R is higher in BG2 than in BG1, and in EG2 than in EG1;
8In the present study, we focus on the determinants on Player As’ behavior, considering Player Bs’ solely as a
source of strategic uncertainty. Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2013) offer a systematic analysis of the patterns of
Player Bs’ decisions in this game.
9Some studies have also documented the effect of the saliency of monetary incentives in coordination games.
See, for example, Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck (2001) for symmetric 2 × 2 games, and Goeree and Holt
(2005); Devetag and Ortmann (2010) for n-player minimum and median effort games.
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(b) Player Bs react to the variations in their own monetary incentives to act efficiently: the
proportion of decisions r is higher in EG1 than in BG1, and in EG2 than in BG2;
(c) Player As react to the variations in Player Bs’ monetary incentives to act efficiently: the
proportion of decisions R is higher in EG1 than in BG1, and in EG2 than in BG2.
The strategic uncertainty that Player As face cannot be directly observed or measured by
the experimenter. Therefore, assessing its behavioral effect requires a benchmark in which the
actual degree of strategic uncertainty can be controlled for. To that end, each of the four games
is implemented under two different conditions: Human and Robot. In the Human treatment,
two human subjects interact in ways described above. In the Robot treatment, a human subject
acting as Player A interacts with a computerized Player B who is pre-programmed to always
choose r. Subjects in the Robot treatment are clearly informed they are interacting with a pre-
programmed computer: “the computer chooses r at each round, without exception” (bold
in the original instruction sheet). This is the only difference in the rules and procedures between
Human and Robot treatments. As a result, subjects in the Robot treatment do not face any
strategic uncertainty. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The Robot treatment neutralizes strategic uncertainty Player As face. As a result,
the proportion of actions R in a given game is higher in the Robot treatments than in the Human
treatments.
While not choosing R in the Human treatment may not necessarily arise from strategic un-
certainty, the same behavior in the Robot treatment must be due to reasons other than strategic
uncertainty. Thus, comparing Player As’ decisions between Human and Robot treatments enables
us to capture the behavioral effect of strategic uncertainty.
Once the behavioral results are established, we then investigate the relationship between sub-
jects’ cognitive ability and their sensitivity to the changes in the degree of strategic uncertainty.
We measure each participant’s cognitive ability by implementing Raven’s test at the end of all
experimental sessions involving the BG2 and EG1 games, under both Robot and Human treat-
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ments. Based on existing experimental results (discussed in the opening section), we formulate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Subjects with high cognitive ability are more sensitive to changes in the degree of
strategic uncertainty than those with low cognitive ability.
2.2 Experimental procedures
Upon arrival, participants are randomly assigned to their computers and asked to fill in a short
personal questionnaire containing basic questions about their age, gender, education, etc.10 The
pre-distributed written set of instructions is then read aloud. Player As are informed that they
will play an unrevealed number of rounds of the same game, each round with a different partner,
and that their own role will not change during the experiment. Before starting, subjects are asked
to answer a quiz assessing their understanding of the game they are about to play. Once the quiz
and any questions from participants are answered, the experiment begins.
The experiment generates observations under eight experimental conditions, varying according
to the payoff structure (BG1, BG2, EG1 or EG2) and Player A’s partner (human subject in
the Human treatment or computer in the Robot treatment). All conditions are implemented
separately, using a between-subject design: each subject plays only one of the four games, and
interacts either with other subjects or with a computer.
For each payoff matrix, we ran three Human treatment sessions (involving 20 subjects per
session: 10 Player As interacting with 10 Player Bs), and two Robot treatment sessions (involving
20 Player As per session interacting with automated Player Bs). The data for the BG1 and EG2
Human treatments come from Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014), while all the other sessions
were carried out in October 2012 and February and March 2014.11 Of the 398 participants (190
10We decided to implement the administrative questionnaire at the beginning of the experiment to reduce the
noise in answers and to avoid an accumulation of post-experimental surveys. As correctly stressed by a referee, this
might raise concerns about anonymity in subjects’ decision-making. However, this part of the design is identical in
all session and thus should not affect our main results that are based on the between-treatment differences.
11The unexpected behavior initially observed for matrices BG1 and EG2 led us to complement our design with
matrices BG2 and EG1, hence the delay between the two sets of experiments. To assure an in-depth exploration of
players’ behavior, these complementary sessions also included Raven’s test.
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males), 323 were students with various fields of specialization.12 The majority of subjects (57 %)
had already taken part in economic experiments. Participants’ average age was 24.05.13 Sessions
lasted about 45–60 minutes, with an average payoff of roughly 12.50 euros in Human treatments
and 15 euros in Robot treatments (including a 5 euros show-up fee, but not the post-experiment
task fee).14 No subject participated in more than one experimental session.
2.3 Control variable on cognitive ability: Raven’s test score
All sessions involving BG2 and EG1 matrices (both under Human and Robot treatments) include
computerized post-experiment tasks. An additional 5 euros is paid to each subject for completing
this part. Immediately after the end of the experimental game, participants are provided with
a brief round-by-round summary of their decisions and outcomes, and are asked to provide any
relevant comments and indicate the things that might have affected their decisions during the
experiment in a blank space on their computer screens. Subjects are also asked to solve a part of
the advanced version of Raven’s test—composed of 16 items to be completed within 10 minutes.
Overall, the data from Raven’s test include 180 subjects: 120 (60 player As and 60 players Bs)
in both Human treatments, and 80 (all player As) in both Robot treatment. As we argue in the
next section of the paper, cognitive ability (measured by Raven’s test score) comes as a granular
explanation of aggregate inefficiencies under different forms of strategic uncertainty and monetary
incentives. However, a necessary condition for this argument to hold is that the distributions of
these scores should not vary across game matrices and Human/Robot treatment. We find strong
evidence that the distribution of cognitive ability does not vary across experimental conditions.
A multiple-treatment comparison using Kruskal–Wallis test with Bonferroni correction does not
12In one EG2 Robot treatment session, we had 18 subjects instead of 20, so for the Robot treatment there were 40
subjects for BG1, BG2 and EG1, and 38 subjects for EG2. For the Human treatment sessions, we had 60 subjects
(half of whom are Player As) for each of the four games.
13All sessions took place at the Laboratoire d’Economie Experimentale de Paris (LEEP) at Paris School of
Economics. Subjects were recruited via an online registration system based on Orsee (Greiner, 2004) and the
experiment was computerized through software developed under Regate (Zeiliger, 2000) and z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
14As will be described below, Raven’s test was included in half of our experimental sessions and was carried out
as a post-experimental task. For this post-experimental task, 15 additional minutes were needed beyond the usual
duration of the sessions (around 45 min, including the time to read the instructions, answer the questionnaires,
play 10 rounds of the experimental game and be paid for participation).
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Figure 1: Proportion of decisions R across rounds and treatments
BG1 BG2 EG1 EG2
Robot
Human
0%
25%
50%
75%
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
reject the null hypothesis that Raven’s test scores in the four experimental conditions come from
the same population (with p = .275). The same test applied at the session-level (10 sessions)
instead of the experimental condition-level yields a p = .694.
3 Results
Figure 1 provides descriptive statistics regarding the behavior of Player As in all our experimental
treatments. The share of Player As who chose R in each round is displayed separately for each
payoff matrix, and the two curves provide a comparison between the Human treatment and the
Robot treatment. Before moving to a detailed analysis of the treatment effects, three main ob-
servations can be made. First, our Human treatment replicates the results seen in the existing
literature: a high proportion of Player As decide to play L, even after several rounds of the game.
Second, between game comparisons of behavior in the Human treatments show this pattern is
barely influenced by the strategic context: while Player As react to changes in incentives they face
(BG2 vs BG1, and EG2 vs EG1), they appear rather insensitive to changes in incentives faced by
Player Bs (EG1 vs BG1, and EG2 vs BG2). Finally, while the share of decisions R in the Robot
treatment always weakly dominates the one in the Human treatment, the absence of strategic
uncertainty in this context does not remove all decisions L. Table 4 in the "Appendix" provides a
robustness check of these effects based on parametric probit models estimated separately for each
11
game on the pooled Human–Robot data. The results suggest that the likelihood of action R in the
initial round of each game is higher in the Robot treatment (dummy variable Robot is significant
for each game). However, the subsequent dynamics do not differ between the two conditions: the
Wald test rejects the joint insignificance of Robot dummy × round effects dummies solely for the
EG2 data.15
In the remainder of this section, the main question we seek to answer is whether and to what
extent strategic uncertainty drives the observed decisions to play L. In the Human treatment,
two factors explain the decisions of Player As: the behavior of Player Bs in the experiment and
how Player As adjust to this behavior. The variations in payoffs between games allows these two
factors to be measured separately. We then move to an analysis of the Robot treatments, in which
strategic uncertainty is removed by design.
3.1 Results from the Human treatment
As summarized in Hypothesis 1, the variations in payoffs between games should induce variations
in the decisions of both players, hence resulting in a variation in the actual strategic uncertainty
faced by Player As. Figure 2 provides an overview of individual behavior in the Human treatment.
Aggregate results suggest that both players react to the variations in their own payoff scheme.
Holding Player Bs’ payoffs constant, Player As are more likely to seek efficiency as their monetary
incentives to do so become more salient: the frequency of R increases from 49 % in BG1 to 73
% in BG2 (p = .001), and from 45 % in EG1 to 74 % in EG2 (p = .005).16 Analogously, Player
Bs become more efficient the higher the cost of acting otherwise: the frequency of r increases
from 81 % in BG1 to 92 % in EG1 (p = .026) and from 81 % in BG2 to 94 % in EG2 (p = .012).
However, despite Player Bs’ responsiveness to their personal monetary incentives, Player As remain
insensitive to this factor: the differences between BG1 and EG1 and between BG2 and EG2 are
15BG1: p = .402; BG2: p = .385; EG1: p = .557; EG2: p = .002.
16We test the difference in proportion of a given outcome between two experimental conditions by carrying out
a two-sided bootstrap proportion test that accounts for within-subject correlation—i.e. the fact that the same
individual takes 10 decisions. The procedure consists of bootstrapping subjects and their corresponding decisions
over all ten rounds instead of bootstrapping decisions as independent observations (see, e.g., Jacquemet, Joule,
Luchini, and Shogren, 2013, for a detailed description of the procedure). In Round 1, data are independent and
thus allow us to analyze behavior with a standard bootstrap proportion test. Frequencies in Round 1 are 23.3 %
in BG1 and 50.0 % in BG2 (p = .027), and 30.0 % in EG1 and 50.0 % in EG2 (p = .091).
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Figure 2: Share of the decisions R (r) for Player As (Bs) in the Human treatments, across rounds
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small and not statistically significant (p = .694 and p = .898, respectively).17
These three observations are supported by the individual-level data summarized in Fig. 3.
The left-hand side provides the Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) of Player As’ frequency
of decisions R, i.e. the number of decisions R taken throughout the ten rounds of the game.
Statistical tests indicate first-order stochastic dominance of the distributions between BG2 and
BG1 (p = .007) and between EG2 and EG1 (p = .021).18 This confirms that Player As’ behavior
depends on the saliency of their own monetary incentives. Figure 3b presents the EDFs of
Player Bs’ individual frequencies of decisions r. These individual-level data stand in line with the
17The analogous frequencies in Round 1 for Player Bs are 80.0 % in BG1 and 83.3 % in EG1 (p = .731), and 76.7
% in BG2 and 86.7 % in EG2 (p = .232); for Player As, they are: 23.3 % in BG1 and 30.0 % in EG1 (p = .583),
and 50.0 % in BG2 and 50.0 % in EG2 (p = .889).
18Our first-order stochastic dominance test is based on a bootstrap version of the univariate Kolmogorov–Smirnov
(KS) test which allows for ties (see, e.g., Abadie, 2002; Sekhon, 2011).
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Figure 3: EDF of the total number of decisions R and r decisions by game
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aggregate outcomes, showing that Player Bs do react to their personal costs of inefficient behavior:
the EDF from EG1 first order stochastically dominates the EDF from BG1 (p = .039), and the
EDF from EG2 first order stochastically dominates the EDF from BG2 (p = .002). This amounts
to a significant change in the actual strategic uncertainty Player A faces. Figure 3a also shows
that there are no significant differences between EG1 and BG1 (p = .783) or between EG2 and
BG2 (p = .914); Player As do not seem to react to the changes in the saliency of Player Bs’
monetary incentives.
Result 1 In the presence of strategic uncertainty, the saliency of monetary incentives affects
players’ behavior as follows:
(a) The proportion of decisions R is higher in BG2 than in BG1, and in EG2 than in EG1:
Player As become more likely to act efficiently the more salient their monetary incentives;
(b) The proportion of decisions r is higher in EG1 than in BG1, and in EG2 than in BG2:
Player Bs become more likely to act efficiently the more salient their monetary incentives;
(c) The proportion of decisions R is not significantly different in EG1 than in BG1, nor in EG2
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Figure 4: EDF of the individual number of decisions R by treatment
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than in BG2: Player As ignore the saliency of Player Bs’ monetary incentives.
3.2 The effect of strategic uncertainty: comparing Human and Robot treat-
ments
In the Robot treatment, Player Bs’ decisions are generated by computers always playing r, hence
eliminating the strategic uncertainty faced by Player As. The change in behavior from Player As
hence identifies the effect of strategic uncertainty in the Human treatment. In Fig. 1 we presented
aggregate statistics on the behavior of Player As. Figure 4 provides individual data for all four
games and both treatments. Each curve provides the EDF of the number of decisions R taken by
each individual in the Human treatment and in the Robot treatment. In the aggregate, in three
games out of four we find a statistically significant increase in the proportion of decisions R when
Player As interact with computerized Player Bs rather than other human subjects: from 49.0 to
77.0 % in BG1, from 44.7 to 69.0 % in EG1 and from 77.0 to 86.6 % in EG2. In BG2, however,
we only observe a weak increase—from 72.5 to 77.3 %.19.
These results are true all along the distribution of the number of decisions R. The EDF in the
Robot treatment first order stochastically dominates the EDF in the Human treatment for BG1
(p < .001), BG2 (p = .004) and EG1 (p = .011); this pattern is not statistically significant for
19These shifts are significant according to bootstrap proportion tests at the 1 % threshold in BG1 (p = .001) and
in EG1 (p = .005), at the 5 % threshold in EG2 (p = .033) and are not statistically significant in BG2 (p = .305)
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Table 3: Spearman’s rank correlation of the number of decisions R and Raven’s test scores
BG2 Human .055 (p = .772, N = 30)Robot .571 (p < .001, N = 40)
EG1 Human -.005 (p = .978, N = 30)Robot .273 (p = .088, N = 40)
EG2 (p = .134).20 The most noticeable difference between the two distributions is the proportion
of Player As who invariably choose R when facing a computer rather than another subject: 50.0
% against 10.0 % in BG1, 65.5 % against 30.0 % in BG2, 37.5 % against 10.0 % in EG1 and 57.9
% against 40.0 % in EG2. This increase is significant at a 1 % threshold for games BG1, BG2 and
EG1 (p = .001, p = .004 and p = .010, respectively) and barely insignificant in EG2 (p = .111).
Importantly, both aggregate and individual results unambiguously show that eliminating strate-
gic uncertainty does not make Player As’ behavior invariably efficient. Altogether, these observa-
tions lead us to the following result:
Result 2 Strategic uncertainty only partially explains Player As’ failure to seek efficiency in the
coordination game. Player As do not consistently select the Pareto–Nash strategy R even when
interacting with a computer who is known to always act efficiently by choosing r.
3.3 Cognitive ability and strategic uncertainty
The crucial question raised by the Human–Robot comparison is why do Player As continue acting
inefficiently in the absence of strategic uncertainty? We investigate this question based on the
cognitive ability of Player As. Cognitive ability is measured by Raven’s test, performed after the
game only in BG2 and EG1, in both Human and Robot treatments. It corresponds to the number
of correct answers to the set of 16 questions.
Table 3 reports the individual correlations between the scores in Raven’s test and decisions
in the game, measured by the number of choices R (between 0 and 10) made throughout the 10
20First-order stochastic dominance (FOD) in BG2 is induced by a sharp increase in the proportion of subjects
playing R in all 10 rounds (from 30.0 % in the Human treatment to 65.5 % in the Robot treatment). This is enough
to induce a statistically significant FOD. In EG2, the magnitude of this increase is small: from 40 % of subjects
playing R in all 10 rounds in the Human treatment to 57.9 % in the Robot treatment.
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Figure 5: Proportion of decisions R across rounds and treatments by ability group
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rounds of the game. We find a positive and significant correlation between these two variables in
the Robot treatments which suggests that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more likely
to play R. However, this correlation disappears in Human treatments. To gain further insights
on the transition between the Robot and Human treatments, we categorize individuals in our
experimental sample according to their score on the Raven’s test. Player As are divided into three
groups, which correspond to the three tertiles of the overall score distribution, (i.e. considering
all Player As from all four experimental conditions, hence 140 subjects.) Subjects in the low-
ability group have a Raven’s test score below 7, those with a Raven’s test score of 7–10 are in the
medium-ability group and those with a score above 10 are in the high-ability group.
Figure 5 presents the proportion of decisions R across rounds by cognitive ability group.21
The aggregate dynamics are very similar across cognitive ability groups, with an increase in the
frequency of decisions R in the first rounds and a stabilization afterwards. This result holds
regardless of whether decisions are taken with computers or humans acting as Player Bs. However,
interacting with computers instead of humans induces an initial upward shift in the ratio of R
that persists over time in the medium- and the high-ability groups, whereas no such shift occurs
in the low-ability group. The mean increase in proportion of decisions R in Round 1 induced
by playing with a computer rather than a human is 22.4 % (p = .057) for the medium-ability
21The data from BG2 and EG1 are pooled to focus on the overall effect of removing strategic uncertainty and
guarantee sufficient sample sizes in each category.
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Figure 6: EDF of the total number of decisions R by treatment and cognitive ability group
Low ability Medium ability High ability
1
.25
.50
.75
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
] of R decisions
Human
Robot
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
] of R decisions
Human
Robot
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
] of R decisions
Human
Robot
group and 38.3 % for the high-ability group (p = .003). The mean difference between these
proportions is still present in Round 10, but to a lesser extent: 15.9 % (p = .074) for the medium-
ability group and 11.5 % (p = .022) for the high-ability group. In the low-ability group, we
find a small and insignificant upward shift in the proportion of decisions R in Round 1 (12.6
%, p = .203), while the proportions of decisions R are almost equally likely in Round 10 (the
difference being -5.5 %, p = .618) in Robot and Human treatments. We assess the robustness of
these patterns by estimating parametric probit models separately for each of the cognitive ability
groups using the pooled Human–Robot data from both games. The results are reported in Table
5 in the "Appendix". First, we confirm the relationship between the behavior observed in Human
and Robot treatments in each ability group (the Robot dummy is insignificant in the low-ability
group model, and positive and significant in the two remaining models). Second, we report that
the dynamics of behavior do not differ between Human and Robot treatments across different
cognitive ability groups. In particular, a Wald test does not reject the joint insignificance of Robot
dummy × round effects dummies for low- (p = .316), medium- (p = .906) and high- (p = .589)
ability groups.
Figure 6 provides the EDFs of the number of decisionsRmade by each subject across ten rounds
for each cognitive ability group in Human and Robot treatments. Three results emerge. First,
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the EDFs in the Human treatment are not statistically different across cognitive ability groups.22
Second, this is not the case in the Robot treatment: the EDF for the low cognitive ability group is
first order stochastically dominated by the EDF for the medium and high cognitive ability groups
(p = .003 and p = .001, respectively). Finally, we observe no such relationship for the medium-
and high-ability groups: the EDFs are not significantly different (p = .318). The main reason
for these results is that the subjects in the low-ability group do not respond to the absence of
strategic uncertainty in Robot treatments by increasing the frequency of decisions R (p = .415),
whereas subjects in the medium- and high-ability groups do so (the tests are based on comparisons
between treatments for each cognitive ability group, the p-values for both are p = .001.)
Such behavior is in line with Hypothesis 3, i.e. Player As with higher cognitive ability are
more sensitive to the change in the degree of strategic uncertainty between Human and Robot
treatments. To provide a formal test of the hypothesis, we first denote R the mean number of R
decisions across 10 rounds by treatment (Robot vs. Human) and type (low cognitive ability vs.
high cognitive ability). The test of Hypothesis 3 is then defined as follows:

H0 : R(Robot, high)−R(Human, high) = R(Robot, low)−R(Human, low)
H1 : R(Robot, high)−R(Human, high) > R(Robot, low)−R(Human, low)
(1)
Empirical results indicate that our hypothesis is likely to be verified withR(Robot, high) = 8.8,
R(Human, high) = 5.8, R(Robot, low) = 5.4, and R(Human, low) = 5.0, which is consistent with
the hypothesis. We statistically tested the result by putting all the terms of Eq. (1) to the
left-hand side, so that the test reduces to a comparison test of multiple means with coefficients
(1;−1;−1; 1).23 The test rejects the null hypothesis when the low cognitive ability group is
compared to the high cognitive ability group (p = .051), as well as when it is compared to the
22To ensure a sufficient sample size in each ability group, we pooled the outcomes from both games in each
treatment. The tests are performed using two-sided bootstrap K-S tests. The p-values of the two-by-two comparisons
are: p = .288 for the low-ability group versus the medium-ability group, p = .599 for the low versus the high and
p = .695 for the medium versus the high.
23Given the group sizes, the bootstrap test is based on re-sampling subjects and the number of times they choose
decision R. To account for asymmetry in the empirical distribution, we computed an equal-tail bootstrap p-value.
See Davidson and MacKinnon (2006) for further details on this procedure.
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medium and high cognitive ability groups pooled together (p = .056). These results allow us to
state our last result:
Result 3 Player As with high cognitive ability are more sensitive to the changes in strategic un-
certainty than those with low cognitive ability.
4 Conclusion
Coordination failure is a widely documented phenomenon, with possibly dramatic economic con-
sequences. While most experimental investigations try to identify the possible sources of strategic
uncertainty underlying such failures, very few explore the effect of strategic uncertainty per se. In
addition, little is known about whether and how behavior under strategic uncertainty is related
to individual cognitive ability.
We used four variations of a classic 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination game to explore
the link between coordination failure, strategic uncertainty and cognitive ability. To isolate the
behavioral effect of strategic uncertainty, we compare the decisions made when facing other human
subjects (Human treatment) to those made against computer programs whose perfectly efficient
behavior is common knowledge (Robot treatment). We find that the occurrence of coordination
failure cannot be entirely explained by strategic uncertainty. First, a non-negligible share of our
subjects failed to act efficiently even in the Robot treatment. Second, behavioral response to
strategic uncertainty is related to individual cognitive ability. Subjects with higher cognitive
ability (as measured by their scores on Raven’s test) systematically adapt their decisions to the
varying degree of strategic uncertainty (i.e., between the Human and Robot treatment), while
those with lower cognitive ability fail to do so.
The relationship between cognitive ability and the sensitivity to strategic uncertainty is a
challenge for institutions aimed at fostering efficient coordination by reducing strategic uncertainty.
These mechanisms—such as the widely studied effect of communication between participants—
usually involve focusing agents’ actions on the desirable equilibrium. However, the presence of
players with a low strategic focus—such as the Raven’s test low scorers in our experiment—may
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undermine the effect and lower the economic value of such institutions. As noted by Ellingsen and
Östling (2010) in the context of a theoretical analysis of communication and coordination in a level-
k setup, “there is a need for evidence that systematically distinguishes the effects of preferences,
belief, and rationality” (p. 1714). We believe that our experimental design and collected data on
the cognitive underpinnings of behavior under strategic uncertainty and the resulting coordination
failure is an important step in this direction.
Appendix: Additional probit estimates
Table 4: Probit models on the decisions to play R, by game
BG1 (n = 700) BG2 (n = 700) EG1 (n = 700) EG2 (n = 680)
Variables Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Round effects (round 1 is referent)
Round 2 .787 .089 1.264 .008 .104 .821 .642 .173
Round 3 1.419 .003 1.070 .023 .515 .273 .863 .076
Round 4 1.448 .003 1.560 .002 .505 .270 1.102 .028
Round 5 1.954 .000 1.586 .002 .712 .123 1.636 .003
Round 6 1.965 .000 1.752 .001 1.411 .005 1.517 .003
Round 7 1.795 .000 1.029 .027 1.411 .005 2.331 .000
Round 8 1.599 .001 1.465 .002 1.136 .018 1.904 .001
Round 9 1.760 .000 1.072 .020 1.180 .015 2.765 .000
Round 10 1.058 .023 2.697 .000 1.397 .004 2.765 .000
Robot effect (dummy—Human treatments are referent)
Robot 2.136 .002 1.713 .032 1.512 .028 2.152 0.003
Robot dummy × round effects
round 2 .728 .273 -.689 .340 .285 .640 .702 0.376
round 3 .044 .948 -.563 .437 .754 .226 -1.920 0.005
round 4 -.561 .397 -1.324 .070 -.117 .847 -1.053 0.139
round 5 -.683 .315 -.509 .513 1.077 .090 -.696 0.378
round 6 -.227 .748 -.676 .383 -.253 .696 -.866 0.255
round 7 -.506 .454 .024 .973 -.291 .654 -2.693 0.001
round 8 -.642 .324 -.115 .878 .480 .455 -.383 0.671
round 9 .244 .733 .004 .995 .437 .499 -2.182 0.012
round 10 .448 .505 -1.919 .026 .219 .735 -2.113 0.016
Constant -1.602 .003 .067 .912 1.384 .008 .039 .939
Joint nullity Wald tests of Robot dummy × round effects
Wald test 9.39 .402 9.58 .385 7.77 .557 25.44 .002
σRE (sd.) 2.074 (.310) 2.740 (.445) 2.101 (.306) 2.146 (.358)
ρ (sd.) .811 (.045) .882 (.034) .821 (.049) .815 (.044)
Note. Probit models on the probability of playing R estimated separately for each payoff configu-
ration, on pooled Human and Robot treatments data. (Exogeneous) unobserved individual hetero-
geneity is accounted for through random individual effects. The covariates are: round fixed effects,
Robot treatment dummy and interactions between the two.
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Table 5: Probit models on the decisions to play R, by Raven ability groups
Raven cognitive ability group
Low (n = 480) Medium (n = 460) High (n = 460)
Variables Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Round effects (round 1 is referent)
round 2 1.130 .109 .504 .272 .600 .316
round 3 1.168 .103 .511 .270 .953 .124
round 4 .306 .651 .939 .049 1.793 .011
round 5 .701 .303 .963 .048 1.729 .010
round 6 2.517 .007 1.116 .021 1.793 .011
round 7 1.757 .026 .929 .051 1.224 .050
round 8 2.517 .007 .919 .050 1.253 .040
round 9 .718 .297 1.130 .018 1.340 .040
round 10 2.517 .007 1.475 .004 2.244 .002
Game effect (dummy - BG2 is referent)
EG1 -.118 .882 -1.948 .000 -1.821 .068
Robot effect (dummy - Human treatments are referent)
Robot 1.184 .250 1.231 .064 3.804 .002
Robot dummy × round effects
round 2 -.881 .290 .016 .983 .531 .606
round 3 -.466 .579 1.214 .143 .178 .864
round 4 -.308 .704 -.113 .882 -1.227 .236
round 5 .912 .273 .752 .375 -.597 .576
round 6 -1.620 .116 .584 .483 -.661 .544
round 7 -.701 .440 .332 .681 -.142 .887
round 8 -1.304 .206 .814 .338 1.945 .205
round 9 .342 .679 .585 .486 1.858 .231
round 10 -1.454 .159 .259 .767 -.470 .677
Constant -1.609 .087 .721 .129 .007 .995
Joint nullity Wald tests of Robot dummy × round effects
Wald test 10.44 .316 4.08 .906 7.46 .589
σRE (sd.) 2.451 (.454) 1.301 (.241) 3.170 (.629)
ρ (sd.) .857 (.045) .628 (.086) .909 (.032)
Note. Probit models on the probability of playing R estimated separately for each
group of cognitive ability measured through the Raven test. For each group, models are
estimated on pooled Human and Robot treatments data across all payoff configurations.
(Exogeneous) unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for through random in-
dividual effects. The covariates are: round fixed effects, Robot treatment dummy and
interactions between the two.
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